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In this article the author analyses the problem of the philosophical background 
of the condictio claims in classical Roman law from three different aspects. First 
he deals with the issue of the apparent origins of the philosophical principles and 
concepts associated with condictio claims in sources such as ius naturale, aequ-
itas, natura, etc. After dismissing the possibility of their postclassical origin, the 
focus of the analysis shifts to the possible influences of certain Greek philosophical 
schools on them, namely the Peripatetics and the Stoics. Finally, the actual reach 
of such influence is discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION ∗∗
Various instances of the use of condictio claims in different periods of Roman 
law and in correspondingly different procedural arrangements may be said to 
have had a generally very important role in the Roman law of obligations. For 
example, the condictio claims were used to reclaim a payment of indebitum (non-
debt), payment of a sum given over in expectation of an event that eventually 
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did not occur, payment of a sum on a legal basis that later ceased to exist, etc.1 
Therefore, it could be said that condictio claims were a sort of remedy for certain 
pecuniary imbalances that occurred in practice. For that reason, they are often 
associated with philosophical concepts and principles such as justice, equity, 
natural law, good faith, etc. in the sources, as it will be shown in the following 
analysis.2
Taking those concepts and principles into consideration, the aim of this paper 
is to try to clarify whether any actual philosophical thought inspired Roman 
law in the pre-classical and classical periods in regard to condictio claims, and if 
it did, in what way and in what measure. Besides having academic relevance, 
this issue bears importance given that the classical condictio claims were the basis 
for the Justinianic system of the condictiones, which in turn was subject of the 
medieval treatment of the matter and later reception of Roman law in Europe.
In order to analyse this problem thoroughly, three different aspects of the 
issue should be dealt with. Firstly, the long-standing problem of the alleged 
postclassical interpolations of the concepts and principles associated with 
condictio claims, the matter that traditionally drew the most attention, should 
be revisited. Secondly, when the most likely timeframe of the origins of those 
concepts and principles is established, the next matter to be dealt with is the 
issue of the ostensible philosophical school that played the most important part 
therein. After that, it is discussed to which extent the pertinent philosophical 
school may have directly affected condictio claims in pre-classical and classical 
Roman law. With such a three-tier approach, we hope to contribute to a more 
thorough understanding of the condictio claims both in Roman law and in their 
later iterations throughout history.
1 On the matter in general, with detailed references to the sources and relevant lite-
rature, see Kaser, M., Das römische Privatrecht I (das altrömische, das vorklassische und 
klassische Recht), München, 1971, pp. 592 sqq.; Kaser, M., Das römische Privatrecht II (die 
nachklassischen Entwicklungen), München, 1975, pp. 421 sqq.; Zimmerman, R., The Law 
of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Cape Town, 1992, pp. 834 sqq.
2 Similarly, contemporary legal systems, in fields that may be associated with condic-
tio claims (for example, unjustified enrichment), generally also acknowledge this 
philosophical and dogmatic aspect of the matter. For an analysis regarding the dog-
matic aspects of unjustified enrichment in Germany (ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung) 
see Gödicke, P., Bereicherungsrecht und Dogmatik, Berlin, 2002. For an overview of a 
number of relevant issues in this regard in common law jurisdictions, see Cham-
bers, R. et al. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment, Oxford, 
2009. For Croatian literature on the matter see Klarić, P.; Vedriš, M., Građansko 
pravo, Zagreb, 2006, p. 644 and Vojković, L., Kondikcijski tužbeni zahtjevi (unpublished 
thesis), Split, 1997, pp. 22 sqq.
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2. THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGINS OF THE PRINCIPLES 
ASSOCIATED WITH CONDICTIO CLAIMS – A POSTCLASSICAL 
INTERPOLATION?
Fragments from Justinian’s Digesta dealing with condictio claims contain 
numerous references to concepts and principles such as justice, equity, natural 
law, etc. In one of the most famous fragments in that regard, attributed to the 
famous 2nd century jurist Pomponius3, D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.), it is stated:
Nam hoc natura aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri locupletiorem.4
According to the fragment, it is in line with natural equity never to enrich 
oneself to the detriment of another. This reference has been generally associ-
ated with the so-called condictio indebiti, or the use of the condictio claim in the 
case of the payment of the indebitum, in a sense that the keeping of a received 
indebitum is inequitable and that the payment should be transferred back. 5 The 
fragment is within the Digesta thus fittingly situated under the 6th titulus of the 
12th book, titled De condictione indebiti. Regarding the reception of Roman law 
and the contemporary legal systems, the principle contained in the fragment has 
always been associated with the condictio indebiti.6 However, it should be noted 
that this fragment in its context within the Digesta might have been related to a 
slightly different matter. The immediately preceding fragment, with which there 
is a connection via the word nam, deals with the ward who has received mutuum 
without auctoritas tutoris, and who, after having paid his debt upon reaching full 
age, cannot request back what he has paid.7 The following fragment, which has 
been cited, confirms this by stating that such a conclusion in this case is war-
ranted by natural equity. Therefore, the apparent context for the rule contained 
in the cited D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) is not a confirmation of the main 
rule for condictio indebiti, but rather a justification for one of its exceptions.8 
3 More on Pomponius in Kunkel, W., Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen, 
Weimar, 1952, pp. 170 sq.
4 For it is by nature fair that nobody should enrich himself at the expense of another (transla-
tion from Watson, A. (ed.), The Digest of Justinian I-IV (English language translation), 
Philadelphia, 1985, vol. I, p. 380).
5 Cf. Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 852. More on the so-called condictio indebiti in clas-
sical law in Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1971), p. 596; Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 848 sqq. 
and in postclassical law Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975), pp. 422 sq. 
6 Cf. Ranieri, F., Europäisches Obligationenrecht, Wien, 2009, p. 1089.
7 D. 12, 6, 13, 1 (Paul. 10 ad sab.).
8 Cf. Wollschläger, C., Das stoische Bereicherungsverbot in der römischen Rechtswissenschaft, 
in: Behrends, O. et al. (eds.), Römisches Recht in der europäischen Tradition. Symposion aus 
Anlass des 75. Geburstages von Franz Wieacker, Ebelsbach, 1985, pp. 41-88, pp. 79, 81.
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This is true at least in the context of the Digesta, since the two fragments are 
attributed to different authors, D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) to Pomponius, 
and the immediately preceding D. 12, 6, 13, 1 (Paul. 10 ad sab.) to Paulus9, and 
therefore the context of the expressed principle in the Pomponius’ original work 
may have been different. However, even in the Digesta the essentially same rule 
has been given the authority of a general rule of law, therefore applicable also 
in the field of condictio claims. In the 17th titulus of the 50th book of the Digesta, 
which deals with different regulae iuris (De diversis regulis iuris antiqui), D. 50, 17, 
206 (Pomp. 9 ex var. lect.), by the same Pomponius, reads:
Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri locuple-
tiorem.10 
The differences in relation to D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) cited earlier 
are that in the present fragment natural law is referenced explicitly, instead of 
only nature (ius naturae and not natura), and as an additional prerequisite for 
the prohibition of enrichment, along with the detriment of another, iniuria 
(unlawfulness) is also named.
Ostensibly, even in the original context of the cited fragments, the condictio 
claim in the case of indebitum may have been strongly associated with nature 
and natural law, at least according to Lenel. To begin with, regarding the 
firstly mentioned D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.), in the reconstruction of 
Pomponius’ Libri ad Sabinum, Lenel situated the mentioned fragment at the very 
beginning of the part titled De condictione, apparently awarding it the force of 
a general rule.11 Further, regarding the preceding fragment in Digesta, D. 12, 
6, 13, 1 (Paul. 10 ad sab.), what follows in the reconstruction of Paul’s Libri 
ad Sabinum is another general principle, namely Indebiti soluti condictio naturalis 
est.12,13 This is essentially the same principle as the one contained in D. 12, 6, 
14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.). Thus, it could be said that the natural law principle of 
prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, as expressed in D. 12, 
9 More on Paulus in Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 244 sq.
10 By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss and injury of another 
(translation from Watson, op. cit. n. 4 (vol. IV), p. 483).
11 Lenel, O., Palingenesia iuris civilis II, Leipzig, 1889, p. 129.
12 Lenel, O., Palingenesia iuris civilis I, Leipzig, 1889, p. 1281.
13 The phrase is the beginning of D. 12, 6, 15 pr. (Paul. 10 ad sab.), translated: The 
condictio is based on natural reason (translation from Watson, op. cit. n. 4 (vol. I), p. 
380).
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6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) and almost identically in D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex 
var. lect.), is intrinsically associated with condictio claims. In addition, there 
are numerous other instances where various applications of condictio claims 
are explicitly associated with such concepts as natura and ius naturae, with 
different terminological variants.14,15
Besides natural law and its conceptual and terminological derivatives, there 
are many other similar references in fragments dealing with condictio claims. For 
example, association of the condictio claims with ius gentium, which was largely 
influenced by natural law and in which good faith (bona fides) played a very 
important role.16 A good example of this is D. 25, 2, 25 (Marc. 3 reg.), which 
in the relevant part reads:
(...) nam iure gentium condici puto posse res ab his, qui non ex iusta causa pos-
sident.17
14 To cite relevant excerpts of some of them: D. 12, 4, 3, 7 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.): (...) sed ipse 
Celsus naturali aequitate motus putat repeti posse. Quae sententia verior est, (...); D. 12, 6, 64 
(Tryph. 7 disp.): (...) ita debiti vel non debiti ratio in condictione naturaliter intellegenda est.
15 More on ius naturale and derived concepts in Roman law in Waldstein, W., Be-
merkungen zum ius naturale bei den klassischen juristen, Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung 
für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, vol. 105, 1988, pp. 702-711; Levy, 
E., Natural Law in Roman Thought, Studia et documenta historiae et iuris, vol. 15, 
1949, pp. 1-24; Albertario, E., Studi di diritto romano V: Storia, metodologia, esegesi, Mi-
lano, 1937, pp. 277 sqq.; Koschembahr-Łyskowski, I., Naturalis ratio en droit classique 
romain, in: Studi in onore di Pietro Bonfante, vol. III, 1930, pp. 467-498.
16 Cf. mention of ius gentium in the same context in Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 853. 
More on the concept of ius gentium in Roman law generally in Mayer-Maly, T., 
Das ius gentium bei den späteren Klassikern, IVRA, vol. 34, 1983, pp. 91-102 and 
Frezza, P., Ius Gentium, Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquite, Mélanges 
Fernand de Visscher, Bruxelles, 1949, pp. 259-308. On the relationship between 
ius naturale and ius gentium see Kroger, J. R., The Philosophical Foundations of Roman 
Law: Aristotle, the Stoics, and Roman Theories of Natural Law, Wisconsin Law Review, 
2004, pp. 905-944, pp. 907 sqq. and Zuckert, M., “Bringing Philosophy down from 
the Heavens”: Natural Right in the Roman Law, The Review of Politics, vol. 51, no. 1, 
1989, pp. 70-85, pp. 72 sqq. 
17 (…) for I hold that in accordance with the jus gentium, property can always be recovered by a 
condictio from people who possess it without proper title (translation from Watson, op. cit. 
n. 4 (vol. II), p. 278). Another example would be D. 12, 6, 47 (Cels. 6 dig.), in the 
relevant part reading: (...) sin autem fideiussor suo nomine solverit quod non debebat, ipsum 
a stipulatore repetere posse, quoniam indebitam iure gentium pecuniam solvit (...).
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Finally, in a number of fragments condictio claims are associated with con-
cepts such as aequitas and that which is bonum et aequum, along with different 
terminological derivatives of the expressions.18 An example can be found in D. 
12, 6, 66 (Pap. 8 quaest.):
Haec condictio ex bono et aequo introducta, quod alterius apud alterum sine causa 
deprehenditur, reuocare consuevit.19,20
This text indicates that a condictio in a specific case was introduced on account 
of equity (bonum et aequum). This, alongside previously enumerated instances of 
association of condictio claims with concepts and principles such as natura, ius 
naturae, ius gentium, aequitas and their derivatives, has been a matter of dispute 
in literature. To be more specific, it has been argued by some scholars of Roman 
law that those principles were typical postclassical concepts, interpolated into 
the classical texts.21 One of the main arguments was that condictio in classical 
18 More on the concept of aequitas in antiquity generally in Kipp, T., Aequitas, in: 
Wissowa, G. (ed.), Paulys Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, vol. 
I, Stuttgart, 1894, pp. 598 sqq. For the relevance of the concept in Roman law see 
Pringsheim, F., Aequitas und bona fides, in: Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 
1961, pp. 154-172 (= Conferenze per il XIV Centenario delle Pandette (15 Dicembre 530-
15 Dicembre 1930), Milano, 1931, pp. 183-214), especially pp. 159 sqq., and more 
recently and in regard to classical Roman law in Stagl, J. F., Die Ausgleichung von 
Vorteil und Nachteil als Inhalt klassischer aequitas, in: Mantovani, D.; Schiavone, A. 
(eds.), Testi e problemi del giusnaturalismo romano, Pavia, 2007, pp. 675-713. For a more 
specific matter of aequitas evidens see Mayer-Maly, T., Aequitas evidens, in: Becker, 
W. G.; Carolsfeld, L. S. von (eds.), Sein und Werden im Recht. Festgabe für Ulrich von 
Lübtow zum 70. Geburtstag am 21. August 1970, Berlin, 1970, pp. 339-352. More on 
the concept of bonum et aequum in Roman law in Pringsheim, F., Bonum et aequum, in: 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 1961, pp. 173-223 (= Zeitschrift der Savigny 
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, vol. 52, 1932, pp. 78-155).
19 This condictio, grounded in the idea of what is good and fair, has become the means of reclaim-
ing whatever, belonging to one in the absence of good cause is found in the hands of another 
(translation from Watson, op. cit. n. 4 (vol. I), p. 388).
20 Further examples include the following: D. 12, 6, 65, 4 (Paul. 17 ad plaut.): Quod ob 
rem datur, ex bono et aequo habet repetitionem: veluti si dem tibi, ut aliquid facias, nec fece-
ris.; D. 25, 1, 5, 2 (Ulp. 36 ad sab.): (...) Et Marcellus admittit condictioni esse locum: sed 
etsi plerique negent, tamen propter aequitatem Marcelli sententia admittenda est. Fragment 
D. 23, 3, 50 pr. (Afr. 8 quaest.) makes a connection with a similar concept of bona 
fides: (...) Illud ex bona fide est et negotio contracto convenit, ut fundus, quasi sine causa penes 
maritum esse coeperit, condicatur.
21 See Pringsheim, op. cit. n. 18 (1932), pp. 215 sqq.; Sanfilippo, C., Condictio indebiti 
I: Il fondamento dell’obbligazione da indebito, Milano, 1943, pp. 56 sqq.; Coing, H., Zum 
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law was an actio stricti iuris, and as such could not have had any connections 
with concepts such as natural law, equity, good faith, etc.22 The ostensibly vague 
and ambiguous nature of those principles was considered uncharacteristic for 
classical casuistic jurisprudence. The principle of prohibition of enrichment to 
the detriment of another, which was also brought into connection with condictio 
claims in the sources, as shown above, was even credited to the influence of 
Christianity in postclassical law.23
However, it seems that it may not be justified to deny a possibility of the 
influence of such philosophical concepts on an action in classical Roman law in 
general. In one case at least an action was apparently awarded explicitly on the 
basis of nature and natural equity, and such an opinion is credited to Labeo, a 
famous lawyer from the age of August.24 In addition, the argument that condictio 
as an actio stricti iuris could not have had anything to do with concepts such as 
natural law and equity may not be necessarily correct, taking into account the 
general functioning of Roman civil procedure. To be more exact, the fact that 
an action was stricti iuris, and as such generally not subject to any considerations 
of equity25, did not hinder the opportunity of the iudex in the second part of 
the procedure to interpret the circumstances in a way that would be conducive 
to the claimant’s cause and still within the lines of the strict directions in the 
Einfluß der Philosophie des Aristoteles auf die Entwicklung des römischen Rechts, Zeitschrift 
der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, vol. 69, 1952, 
pp. 24-59, pp. 40 sqq.; Schwarz, F., Die Grundlage der condictio im klassischen römischen 
Recht, Münster, 1952, pp. 305 sqq. Cf. Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 853.
22 Pringsheim, op. cit. n. 18 (1932), p. 215; cf. Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 853.
23 See Riccobono, S., Cristianesimo e diritto privato, Rivista di diritto civile, vol. 3, 1911, 
pp. 37-70, p. 56; Pringsheim, F., Römische aequitas der christlichen Kaiser, in: Gesam-
melte Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 1961, pp. 224-246 (= Acta congressus iuridici inter-
nationalis, vol. I, Rim, 1934, pp. 119-152), p. 242.
24 D. 47, 4, 1, 1 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.). The fragment deals with an action against a slave 
who is directed in the will to be freed and then, after the death of his owner, he 
steals or destroys something from the inheritance before it has been accepted. 
In such a case no action would have been prescribed if it was not for such an 
interpretation of Labeo’s, based on considerations of natural law. The fragment 
is attributed to Ulpian, a famous lawyer from the 3rd century (more on Ulpian in 
Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 245 sqq. and in Honoré, T., Ulpian. Pioneer of Human Rights, 
Oxford, 2002), but it references Marcus Antistius Labeo, one of the most famous 
Roman civilian lawyers from the turn of the millennium (more on him in Kunkel, 
op. cit. n. 3, pp. 114 sq.).
25 More on the characteristics of actiones stricti iuris in Kaser, M.; Hackl, K., Das rö-
mische Zivilprozessrecht, München, 1996, p. 334.
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praetor’s formula. Zimmerman aptly substantiated this theory on the basis of D. 
12, 1, 32 (Cels. 5 dig.), the famous Si et me et Titium fragment.26,27
In this fragment one person is asking two different persons to formally 
promise a loan by stipulatio. One of them directs his debtor to stipulate to give 
the loan to the potential borrower. After the stipulation, the borrower is in 
error regarding whose debtor made the stipulation. The question that arises is 
whether the borrower became the debtor in relation to the person who directed 
his debtor to make the stipulation or not. This matter is obviously within the 
realm of interpretation, and the basis for the final decision, in which it is stat-
ed that the obligation (and the corresponding action) indeed exists, is the fact 
that the most important aspect is not a lack of a contractual link between the 
creditor and the borrower, but the fact that the borrower in the end received 
the money belonging ultimately to the creditor, which should, for that reason, 
be subject to reimbursement.28 This example fittingly illustrates a possibility 
26 D. 12, 1, 32 (Cels. 5 dig.): Si et me et Titium mutuam pecuniam rogaveris et ego meum deb-
itorem tibi promittere iusserim, tu stipulatus sis, cum putares eum titii debitorem esse, an mihi 
obligaris? subsisto, si quidem nullum negotium mecum contraxisti: sed propius est ut obligari te 
existimem, non quia pecuniam tibi credidi (hoc enim nisi inter consentientes fieri non potest): sed 
quia pecunia mea ad te pervenit, eam mihi a te reddi bonum et aequum est (You asked for a loan 
of money from both myself and Titius, and I told my debtor to make a promise to you. You took a 
stipulation from him thinking him to be the debtor of Titius. Are you under an obligation to me? 
My position remains unchanged if, indeed, you have contracted no transaction with me; but it is 
nearer the mark to suppose that you are under an obligation to me, not because I have lent you 
money (that can only happen between parties who are agreed), but because my money has come 
into your hands and it is right and fair that you should give it back (translation from Watson, 
op. cit. n. 4 (vol. I), p. 362)). See Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 853 sq.
27 For an analysis of the fragment’s authenticity see Mayer-Maly, T., Vom Rechtsbegriff 
der Römer, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, vol. 9, no. 2, 1958, pp. 
151-173, pp. 161 sq. For an interpretation of this fragment within the context of the 
Justinianic and Byzantine law see Jong, H. de, A Byzantine interpretation of D. 12,1,32 and 
similar Digest fragments, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, vol. 80, 2012, pp. 47-76.
28 This action for reimbursement was later named condictio Iuventiana in honour of its 
author, Publius Iuventius Celsus (cf. Hallebeek, J., Some remarks concerning the so-called 
Condictio Iuventiana (D. 12, 1, 32), Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquite, 
3e série, vol. 32, 1985, pp. 247-255, p. 248. More on the action in general in ibid., 
pp. 247 sqq. More on Celsus in Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 146 sq.); admittedly, there 
is no mention of the condictio in the fragment. This is one of the reasons why, for 
example, Jan Hallebeek argues that the action in question was the so called actio 
in id quod pervenit and not a condictio (Hallebeek, J., The condiction as enrichment action 
in twelfth and thirteenth century legal scholarship, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 
vol. 63, 1995, pp. 263-272, p. 265, n. 5 and Hallebeek, op. cit. (1985), p. 247 sqq. 
More on this action in Schulz, F., Die actiones in id quod pervenit und in quantum 
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to apply an interpretative tool such as equity without warping the principles 
of classical Roman law. In the present case, equity (explicitly bonum et aequum) 
does not entail some intangible principle of general justness, it is a specific and 
practical application of a commonsensical and sound rule that the obligation 
should exist between the person to whom the money originally belonged and 
the person to whom it was ultimately directed. 
A similar conclusion could be reached regarding other instances of the asso-
ciation of the analysed principles and concepts with condictio claims. This applies 
especially in the case of the general principle from D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex 
var. lect.), which explicitly mentions iniuria, meaning unlawfulness, as a basis for 
an enrichment detrimental to another and as such subject to reimbursement.29 
For this reason, interpolationistic theories regarding the mentioned principles 
and references to nature, natural law, equity and the like, in association with 
the general prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another and in the 
context of the condictio claims, are more recently generally rejected.30
3. THE CONNECTION OF PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATED WITH 
CONDICTIO CLAIMS WITH SPECIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL 
SCHOOLS
In the previous part we have established that philosophical terminology in 
the context of condictio claims should not be considered a postclassical interpo-
lation, and that it thus falls within the scope of pre-classical and classical law. 
locupletior factus est (inaugural Dissertation), Borna, 1905). However, the fragment 
obviously deals with mutuum, for which condictio is a standard action (more on mu-
tuum in Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1971), pp. 539 sqq.; Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975), pp. 369 sq.; 
Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 153 sqq.), and is situated under the rubric De rebus cred-
itis si certum petetur et de condictione in the Digesta. Finally, even glossators considered 
the action in the fragment to be precisely a condictio (cf. Hallebeek, op. cit. (1995), 
pp. 265 sqq.).
29 More details on this in Mayer-Maly, T., Privatautonomie und Vertragsethik im Digesten-
recht, IVRA, vol. 6, 1955, pp. 128-138, p. 136.
30 See Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975), p. 422; Honoré, T., Gaius, Oxford, 1962, p. 38; 
Mayer-Maly, op. cit. n. 29, p. 136; Didier, P., Les diverses conceptions du droit naturel 
a l’oeuvre dans la jurisprudence romaine des IIe et IIIe siecles, SDHI, vol. 47, 1981, pp. 
195-262, p. 224; Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 41. More on the relationship between 
ethics and the law in classical Roman law in Albertario, op. cit. n. 15, pp. 3 sqq., and 
Albertario, E., Etica e diritto nel mondo classico latino, Rivista internazionale di filoso-
fia del diritto, vol. 12, 1932, pp. 18-35.
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Therefore, the issue of specific philosophical thought or schools that may have 
influenced condictio claims essentially involves the Greek philosophical schools 
present in Rome in the pertinent time period. Generally speaking, Greek phi-
losophy did not exert a more substantial influence in Rome before the period 
of the late Republic, and it began to affect Roman society some time during 
the course of the 2nd century BC.31 Seemingly, the general public was at first 
indisposed towards Greek philosophy, as it probably appeared to run contrary 
to the established morals and public order. That may be an explanation of the 
Senatus consultum de philosophis et rhetoribus from 161 BC, which prohibited Greek 
philosophers to permanently settle in Rome.32 However, already in 156 BC 
the most famous Athenian philosophical schools, the Academic, the Stoic and 
the Peripatetic, established their branches in Rome, being represented by Car-
neades, Diogenes and Critolaus, respectively. This enabled a stronger influence 
of Greek philosophy in Rome.33 Only two of those philosophical schools and 
their teachings have been brought into connection with the condictio claims and 
the pertinent principles in literature, namely Peripatetics and Stoics.34
3.1. The Aristotelian and Peripatetic concept of commutative justice
Prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another has been brought 
into connection in literature with the Peripatetic, or essentially Aristotle’s (4th 
century BC) concept of justice.35 Aristotle deals with justice in the fifth book of 
31 Cf. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, Göttingen, 1948, p. 257; 
Bund, E., Rahmenerwägungen zu einem Nachweis stoischer Gedanken in der römischen Juri-
sprudenz, in: Harder, M.; Thielmann, G. (eds.), De iustitia et iure: Festgabe für Ulrich 
von Lübtow zum 80. Geburtstag, Berlin, 1980, pp. 127-145, p. 128.
32 Bund, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 130 sq.
33 Cf. Behrends, O., Les “veteres” et la nouvelle jurisprudence à la fin de la République, Revue 
historique de droit français et étranger, vol. 55, 1977, pp. 7-33, p. 24; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, 
p. 131. Another famous Greek philosophical school is markedly missing from this list, 
namely the Epicureans. The reason is that this school was considered to be most dan-
gerous for public order in Rome. Their radical materialism was considered outlandish 
and running contrary to traditional Roman values, while their discouragement of the 
public engagement and advancement of political careers seemed almost unnatural to 
the Romans. Hence, it is no surprise that Epicurean philosophers Alkaios and Philis-
kos (Alcaeus and Philiscus) were banished from Rome during the consulate of Lucius 
Postumius around 173 BC (cf. Behrends, op. cit., p. 24; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 129 sqq.).
34 Cf. Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 43 sqq., 46 sqq., with references to further literature.
35 Cf. Schulz, op. cit. n. 28, pp. 19 sqq.; Coing, op. cit. n. 21, pp. 41 sq.; Wollschläger, op. 
cit. n. 8, p. 43. More on the relevance of the Aristotelian concept of justice in the 
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his Nicomachean Ethics.36 Therein firstly the general concept of justice is estab-
lished, which Aristotle considers to represent the perfect virtue.37 This abstract 
concept of universal justice could be associated with law and morality in gener-
al.38 However, this concept is not subject of his further analysis, where instead 
he deals in detail with justice in a particular sense.39 This so-called particular 
justice is further divided into two types of justice. One of them is τὸ διανεμητικὸν 
δίκαιον (tò dianemetikòn díkaion), or distributive justice, meaning a type of justice 
dealing with the distribution of honours, wealth and other distributable goods 
in a community, according to which members of a community could be equal 
or unequal.40 The other type of justice is τò διορθοτικòν δίκαιον (tò diorthotikòn 
díkaion), or commutative justice, and it is exactly this type of justice that has been 
associated with condictio claims, and therefore deserves a closer look.
Commutative justice deals with what Aristotle names συνάλλαγμα (synállag-
ma). In the usual translation, the meaning of that word would be a contract or a 
covenant.41 However, as it will be shown, not only contracts were covered by the 
term in Aristotle’s text, so perhaps a better translation would be transactions, al-
though even that should not be understood in a strictly legal sense.42 To be more 
context of unjustified enrichment in the common law systems in Klimchuk, D., Un-
just Enrichment and Corrective Justice, in: Neyers, J. W. et al. (eds.), Understanding Unjust 
Enrichment, Oxford, 2004, pp. 111-137; Klimchuk, D., The Structure and Content of the 
Right to Restitution for Unjust Enrichment, University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 57, 
no. 3, 2007, pp. 661-684, pp. 674 sqq. and Botterell, A., Property, Corrective Justice, 
and the Nature of the Cause of Action in Unjust Enrichment, Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence, vol. 20, no. 2, 2007, pp. 275-296. For the same in Croatian law 
see Vojković, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 23 sq. For a general analysis of the development of the 
concept of justice in antiquity in the context of Aristotle’s philosophy see Manthe, 
U., Beiträge zur Entwicklung des antiken Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes I: Die Mathematisierung 
durch Pythagoras und Aristoteles, Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschich-
te, Romanistische Abteilung, vol. 113, 1996, pp. 1-31.
36 Cf. EN V, 1129a, 1 sqq.
37 Cf. EN V, 1129b, 25 sqq.
38 Lee, H. D. P., The Legal Background of Two Passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, The Clas-
sical Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 3-4, 1937, pp. 129-140, p. 129.
39 Ibid. 
40 EN V, 1130b, 30 sqq.
41 See translation of συνάλλαγμα, ατος, τό in Liddell, H. G. et al., A Greek-English Lexi-
con, Oxford, 1940, available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu (last accessed in April 
2019).
42 Cf. translations in Reeve, C. D. C. (ed.), Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge, 
2014, p. 81; Bartlett, R. C.; Collins, S. D. (eds.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Chica-
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specific, Aristotle, under συνάλλαγμα (synállagma), numbers both “voluntary” 
and “involuntary” transactions (ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα (hekoúsia synallágmata) 
and ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (akoúsia synallagmáta)).43 Under voluntary trans-
actions Aristotle lists selling, buying, lending with interest, pledging, giving 
free use of something, depositing, and hiring out. Involuntary transactions are 
futhrer divided into those that arise in a clandestine way (λαθραῖα (lathraĩa), 
for example theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, enticing slaves away, murder 
by treachery, betrayal) and those that involve force (βίαια (bíaia), for example 
assault, imprisonment, murder, abduction, disabling, verbal abuse, insulting 
treatment).
Besides, Aristotle maintains that commutative justice is achieved by estab-
lishing a just division of goods between relevant subjects, and gives a detailed 
account and a formula for how it may be achieved.44 Further, Aristotle gives an 
example for the application of commutative or corrective justice.45 He provides 
an illustration where one person injures or kills another, and then the judge has 
to establish a balance between them, since the act of injury on the one side and 
the corresponding suffering on the other constitute unequal parts in a division. 
Although Aristotle concedes that the following terms may not be applicable in 
all cases (the case of physical injury manifestly being one), he still defines such 
transactions as having a “profit” on one side and a “loss” on the other, and states 
that the role of the judge is to level them out.
When evaluating this Aristotle’s treatise on justice, it should be noted that 
it is generally of a non-legal character.46 More to the point, it serves as an in-
troduction and context for his philosophical definition of commutative justice, 
and does not form part of a legal classification. Roughly, perhaps his division 
on voluntary and involuntary transactions could be associated with Roman 
obligationes ex contractu and ex delicto.47 However, the question remains where in 
such a system condictio claims could be classified. They definitely do not fall 
go, 2011, p. 95; Ross, D.; Brown, L. (eds.), Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford, 
2009, p. 84. For the role of the Aristotle’s concept of commutative justice in con-
tract law see Harke, J. D., Vorenthaltung und Verpflichtung. Philosophische Ansichten der 
Austauschgerechtigkeit und ihr rechtshistorischer Hintergrund, Berlin, 2005, pp. 11 sqq., 
with further references.
43 EN V, 1131a, 1 sqq.
44 EN V, 1131b, 1 sqq.
45 EN V, 1132a, 5 sqq.
46 Cf. Harrison, A. R. W., Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, and the Law of Athens, 
The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 77, no. 1, 1957, pp. 42-47, pp. 46 sq. 
47 Cf. Lee, op. cit. n. 38, p. 130.
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under voluntary obligations, since they do not arise voluntarily. On the other 
hand, involuntary obligations in Aristotle’s system comprise what is defined as 
delicta in Roman law, and that is a separate field altogether.48 So essentially, in 
this Aristotle’s classification and explication of justice there is no place for a 
concept such as condictio claims in Roman law.
Further, establishing a balance between two subjects according to the pre-
viously mentioned Aristotle’s formula is definitely a worthy contribution to 
the concepts of justice and equity. However, it is not specifically applicable in 
the field of condictio claims. Generally speaking, the way in which the balance 
should be achieved in coordinated pecuniary relationships is fairly self-explan-
atory. The party that has been enriched to the detriment of another should be 
indebted to that person in the amount in which the detriment occurred, and 
no special formula, as the one Aristotle lays out, is actually needed for such a 
conclusion. In addition, Aristotle’s example for commutative justice is completely 
inappropriate in the context of condictio claims. He describes a procedure (δίκη 
(díke)) in which a judge delivers a sentence against a person who injured or killed 
another person. While it could be argued that one person did suffer a detriment 
here, perhaps even pecuniarily calculable to the amount of pertinent medical 
(or funerary) expenses, the person inflicting the injury definitely did not gain 
anything legally relevant from such a “transaction” in itself.49 The imbalance 
that Aristotle explains is an imbalance in the justice as a theoretical and abstract 
equilibrium existing between members of a society in status quo, which obviously 
cannot always be defined in pecuniary terms. For that reason, its application 
in any private legal context is dubious at best.
Finally, even on a general level, Aristotle’s philosophy is not likely to have 
influenced Roman law in any relevant measure. For example, in other places in 
his work Aristotle explicitly condemns commercial activity oriented towards 
profit and loaning with interest.50 This is something that obviously could not 
have been accepted as general ethics of Roman law, which dealt extensively with 
48 As can be seen in the general literature on condictio claims cited in n. 1, in the Justin-
ianic sources they are classified as obligations arising quasi ex contractu, which means 
that they are similar to but still sufficiently different from contracts (due to a lack 
of intention of the parties to create an obligation). More on delictual obligations in 
Roman law in Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1971), pp. 609 sqq.; Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975), pp. 
425 sqq.; Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 902 sqq.
49 As has been noted previously, even Aristotle was aware of the questionable applica-
bility of the terms “profit” and “loss” in the example. Cf. Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, 
pp. 44 sq.
50 Ibid., pp. 45 sq.
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such matters and did not consider them to be unethical in themselves. This 
may be one of the reasons why Aristotle’s and general Peripatetic concept of 
aspiring to medial ground as a perfect way to achieve justice and all the other 
virtues was marginalised in Rome, and was considered to be weak and without 
any practical significance.51 It is not surprising, therefore, that not one Roman 
lawyer is considered to be a follower of the Peripatetic school.52
For all the abovementioned reasons, it is most likely that Aristotle’s concept of 
commutative justice did not exert any significant influence on the Roman legal 
principles associated with condictio claims, especially prohibition of enrichment 
to the detriment of another. Aristotle’s explication of justice in general, and of 
commutative justice in particular, is not particularly suitable for condictio claims 
and the accompanying principles in the sources. Consequently, any association 
of Aristotle’s commutative justice in the context of condictio claims is probably a 
post facto connection between the two phenomena. Aristotle’s concept is without 
a doubt a very valuable contribution to the philosophical concept of justice, but 
has no larger bearing in a strictly legal context, and it most likely did not have 
a role in the creation and application of the condictio claims in the pre-classical 
and classical Roman law.
3.2. Stoic prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another
Another philosophical school that may have influenced philosophical prin-
ciples associated with condictio claims is Stoicism. On a general level, Stoics are 
among the rare philosophical schools that left a significant trace in Rome.53 Stoic 
ethics, the segment of Stoic philosophy most accepted in Rome54, dealt with the 
problem of permissible and impermissible human actions, thus being closely 
associated with Roman jurisprudence.55 In the context of pre-classical and clas-
sical Roman law, in which condictio claims may have been influenced, primarily 
relevant are the so-called middle Stoics. The most prominent representatives 
thereof were Panaetius of Rhodos (c. 180–110 BC) and his pupil Posidonius of 
Apameia (135–51 BC).56 The great number of prominent Romans counting as 
51 Behrends, op. cit. n. 33, p. 24.
52 Bund, op. cit. n. 31, p. 134.
53 Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit. n. 31, p. 276; Behrends, op. cit. n. 33, p. 24; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, p. 128. 
54 Bund, op. cit. n. 31, p. 142.
55 Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 259 sqq.; Behrends, op. cit. n. 33, p. 34; Bund, op. cit. n. 
31, pp. 133 sqq.
56 Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 48.
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followers of this school at the time testifies to its significance.57 Among them 
were many Republican lawyers, such as Quintus Mucius Scaevola (augur), Quin-
tus Aelius Tubero and Publius Rutilius Rufus (pupils of Panaetius of Rhodos), 
Lucius Furius Philus, Manius Manilius, Quintus Mucius Scaevola (pontifex) 
and Sextus Pompeius, while Pacuvius Antistius Labeo (father of famous Marcus 
Antistius Labeo) and Servius Sulpicius Rufus are presumed as followers.58
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), who may be said to have embodied an 
eclectic influence of Greek culture on Rome, was also under a strong influence of 
Stoic teachings. During the period of the middle Stoics he left a strong mark on 
Roman jurisprudence.59 In the matters of justice and equity he is considered to 
have been under a direct influence of the main representatives of Stoic thought 
of the time, the already mentioned Panaetius and Posidonius.60 For this reason, 
Cicero’s work deserves a closer look in this analysis. In that context, prohibition 
of enrichment to the detriment of another may be brought into connection with 
a general prohibition of damage or of incurring an injury to another, which 
existed even in the early Stoic philosophy.61 This principle is also enunciated 
by Cicero in his work De finibus bonorum et malorum, in CIC. fin. III, xxi, 71:
Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, alienumque esse a sapiente 
non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere.62
Prohibition of incurring damage to another person can be found in the works 
of later Stoic writers, such as Seneca (c. 1-65), for example in his Ad Lucilium 
57 For example, Marcus Vigellius, Caius Laelius, Caius Fannius, Spurius Mummius, 
Cato Uticensis, Scipio Nasica, and to an extent Marcus Terentius Varro (Bund, op. 
cit. n. 31, pp. 131 and 137, n. 85).
58 Bund, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 143 sq.
59 Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit. n. 31, p. 269; Levy, op. cit. n. 15, pp. 2 sqq.; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, p. 
128. More on natural law as a result of the influence of Stoic teachings in Cicero’s 
work in Alonso, F. L., Cosmopolitanism and Natural Law in Cicero, in: Contreras, F. 
J. (ed.), The Threads of Natural Law. Unravelling a Philosophical Tradition, Dordrecht, 
2013, pp. 27-36. More on Cicero’s influence on the law and lawyers in Harries, J., 
Cicero and the Jurists, London, 2006 and Powell, J.; Paterson, J. (eds.), Cicero the Advo-
cate, Oxford, 2004.
60 Pohlenz, op. cit. n. 31, p. 269; Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 48.
61 Cf. Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 50.
62 Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign 
to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone (translation from 
Rackham, H. (ed.), Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, Cambridge, 1931, p. 291).
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epistulae morales.63 In both examples prohibition of incurring damage to another 
person is associated with nature or natural law. This principle was reflected in 
classical Roman law, for example in Ulpian’s famous praecepta iuris.64
However, explicit prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, 
which could be considered a more specified instance of the prohibition of caus-
ing damage or injury, exists only in the philosophy of the middle Stoics. This 
is most adequately expressed by Cicero in his De officiis, in CIC. off. III, v, 21:
Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommode suum commodum augere 
magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera quae 
possunt aut corpora accidere aut rebus externis.65
Cicero here declares how acquisition of property to the detriment of another is 
contrary to nature, and compares this phenomenon to calamities such as death, 
poverty, pain and any other infliction upon person or property.
Although this rule is not stated in writings defining basic Stoic principles, 
Cicero announces it with the words sed redeo ad formulam, thus defining it as 
a formula of Stoic ethics.66 The relevance of this ethical maxim stems from a 
controversy between Academic and Stoic philosophy in the second century BC. 
These two schools, both represented in Rome, had a fundamental disagreement 
regarding the question whether one should behave honestly and honourably, 
or whether the best course of action is to pursue only that which is beneficial 
and advantageous for an individual (the conflict between honestum and utile).67 
Philosopher Carneades (c. 213–128 BC), representing the Academics, argued 
that the true wisdom lies in doing only what is advantageous, or utile, for an indi-
vidual. He maintained that it was impossible to strive only for what is honestum, 
63 SEN. ep. 95, 52.
64 D. 1, 1, 10, 1 (Ulp. 1 reg.). More on this fragment and its philosophical implications 
in Petrak, M., Plato and Ulpian’s praecepta iuris, Fundamina, vol. 20, no. 2, 2014, 
pp. 694-701 and Diesselhorst, M., Die Gerechtigkeitsdefinition Ulpians in D. 1, 1, 10 pr. 
und die Praecepta iuris nach D. 1, 1, 10, 1 sowie ihre Rezeption bei Leibniz und Kant, in: 
Behrends, O. et al. (eds.), Römisches Recht in der europäischen Tradition. Symposion aus 
Anlass des 75. Geburstages von Franz Wieacker, Ebelsbach, 1985, pp. 185-212.
65 Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour’s 
loss is more contrary to nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect 
either our person or our property (translation from Miller, W. (ed.), Cicero, De officiis, 
London, 1913, p. 289).
66 CIC. off. III, iv, 20 (cf. Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 47.).
67 Behrends, op. cit. n. 33, p. 24; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 131 sqq.; Wollschläger, op. cit. 
n. 8, p. 47.
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since that would entail negating an innate instinct towards self preservation.68 
Therefore, the only ethical principle should be to do what is utile, or useful and 
advantegeous for an individual. 
This was unacceptable for Stoic philosophy and ethics. Cicero explicitly states 
that his teacher Posidonius considers the ethical conundrum of doing what is 
honestum or utile to be a matter of paramount importance in philosophy.69 In Stoic 
ethics this problem is solved by arguing that while something is advantageous 
for one person and simultaneously disadvantageous or detrimental to another, 
it is not truly utile.70 Such an ethical maxim does not prohibit behaviour the 
purpose of which is to achieve a more advantageous or beneficial position of 
an individual, it only prohibits such behaviour which concurrently damages 
another person. This ethical position was very welcome in Rome (as it is likely 
to be in any orderly functioning society). On the one hand, it does not burden 
advancement of a personal career or profit with the impression of apparent moral 
dubiousness. On the other hand, it establishes reasonable limits to advancement 
of personal gain, which enable every member of a given society to try to further 
one’s interests while not infringing anybody and everybody else’s.
The previously cited and analysed fragments of Pomponius, relevant in the 
context of the prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another in Roman 
law in general, and with condictio claims and unjustified enrichment specifically, 
express an extremely similar ethical maxim. According to one of them, prohi-
bition of enrichment detrimental to another person runs contrary to nature, 
and the other explicitly cites natural law as the basis for the same opinion.71 
Actually, the only relevant difference in relation to Cicero’s expression of the 
Stoic formula is that Cicero, when explaining gain and loss, uses the phrases 
68 Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 47; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 132 sq.
69 CIC. off. III, ii, 8: Quem locum miror a Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam com-
mentariis, praesertim cum scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium (And 
I am surpised that Posidonius has but briefly touched upon this subject in certain memoirs of 
his, and especially, as he states that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so 
essentially important as this (translation from Miller, op. cit. n. 65, p. 277)).
70 CIC. off. III, xxx, 110: Est enim nihil utile, quod idem non honestum, nec quia utile hon-
estum, sed quia honestum utile (For nothing can be expedient which is not at the same time 
morally right; neither can a thing be morally right just because it is expedient, but it is expedient 
because it is morally right (translation from Miller, op. cit. n. 65, p. 391)). This is ex-
pressed more concisely in CIC. off. III, xii, 49: Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id nunquam 
esse utile (Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is morally wrong can 
never be expedient (translation from Miller, op. cit. n. 65, p. 319)).
71 See D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) and D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex var. lect.) anal-
ysed above.
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commodum and incommodum, while Pomponius uses locupletior and detrimentum. 
Analogous and completely relatable pairs of terms exist in numerous other 
places throughout Digesta.72 
This should not be surprising. Pomponius was a member of the Sabinian 
school, which is considered to have been under a stronger influence of Stoic 
teachings.73 Besides that, not only the mentioned Pomponius fragments can be 
brought into connection with the Stoic school. As can be seen above, the other 
fragments dealing with condictio claims in classical Roman law overflow with 
references to concepts such as natura, ius naturae, ius gentium, aequitas, bonum et 
aequum and other derived terms. Those concepts can be most clearly associated 
with the Stoic philosophy.74 Therefore, it could be concluded that the concept 
of prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, along with the gen-
eral association of natural law, nature, equity and justice, etc. in the context of 
72 For example, locupletior and pauperior: D. 24, 1, 5, 8 (Ulp. 32 ad sab.), D. 24, 1, 25 
(Clem. 5 ad l. iul. et pap.) and D. 24, 3, 66, 7 (Iav. 6 ex post. lab.), also lucrum and 
damnum: D. 2, 10, 3, 1 (Iul. 2 Dig.), D. 2, 15, 8, 22 (Ulp. 5 de omn. trib.), D. 4, 3, 
1 pr. (Ulp. 11 ad ed.), D. 4, 3, 28 (Gai. 4 ad ed. provinc.), D. 4, 6, 18 (Paul. 12 ad 
ed.), D. 11, 7, 14, 1 (Ulp. 25 ad ed.), D. 23, 3, 6, 2 (Pomp. 14 ad sab.), D. 23, 3, 16 
(Ulp. 34 ad sab.) and D. 27, 9, 13, 1 (Paul. l.S. ad or. severi.). Expression damnum 
is replaced by iactura in D. 5, 3, 38 (Paul. 20 ad ed.), D 14, 3, 17, 4 (Paul. 30 ad 
ed.) and D. 20, 5, 12, 1 (Tryph. 8 disp.) (cf. Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 55 sqq.). 
Terminological pair commodum and incommodum, used by Cicero in the mentioned 
formula, is otherwise used in Digesta in the definition of property (bona), which is 
defined as comprising both commoda and incommoda (benefits and disadvantages) in 
D. 50, 16, 83 (Iav. 5 ex plaut.). Also, the pair appears in D. 50, 17, 10 (Paul. 3 ad 
sab.), where it is stated that it is in accordance with nature that the person enjoying 
commoda should also bear the burden of the pertinent incommoda: Secundum naturam 
est commoda cuiusque rei eum sequi, quem sequentur incommoda).
73 Honoré, op. cit. n. 30, pp. 25 sqq.
74 Cf., for example, Colish, M. L., The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle 
Ages I.: Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature, Leiden, 1990, pp. 31 sqq. Vander Waerdt, 
in his excellent and very detailed analysis regarding the influence of the Stoic phil-
osophical concept of natural law on classical Roman jurisprudence, is generally 
suspicious regarding the Stoic provenance of the said concepts (Vander Waerdt, P. 
A., Philosophical Influence on Roman Jurisprudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law, 
in: Haase, W. (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol. 36, 7 (Philosophie, 
Wissenschaften, Technik. Philosophie), Berlin, 1994, pp. 4851-4900, pp. 4866, 
4879, 4893). His conclusion is that while Stoic etymology may well have indeed 
been used, it did not bring any substantial change to the legal reasoning of Roman 
law (op. cit., pp. 4894 sq.), which is actually very similar to the conclusion reached in 
this text in regard to the philosophical background of condictio claims.
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condictio claims, in principle stem from the Stoic philosophy and ethics.75 The 
question that remains is: what was the actual reach of this influence, or what role 
did the mentioned principles and concepts have in the creation and application 
of condictio claims in classical Roman law? These questions are addressed below.
4. THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
CLASSICAL CONDICTIO CLAIMS 
Generally speaking, opinions on the scope of influence of Stoic philosophy 
on Roman law differ. In the older theory the view was held that concepts such 
as natural law, nature, equity, etc. stem from the Stoic philosophical school, 
and there were no doubts that they exerted a direct influence in many different 
areas of pre-classical and classical Roman law.76 On the other hand, a repudia-
tion of any substantial philosophical influence also exists in literature. Extant 
philosophical concepts in the sources are thus consequently attributed to a post-
classical vulgarisation, abstract philosophical and moral concepts, Christianity 
and the like.77 A sort of a median viewpoint holds that philosophical concepts 
and principles generally did not really have any substantial influence on Roman 
law. However, it is stated that they did have a very important role in the field 
of legal systematisation and categorisation, as well as regarding philosophemes 
and terminology taken over in Roman law from certain philosophical schools.78 
75 This is very convincingly supported by Christian Wollschläger in Wollschläger, op. 
cit. n. 8, pp. 46 sqq. For a critique of this opinion see Kupisch, B., Ungerechtfertigte 
Bereicherung. Geschichtliche Entwicklungen, Heidelberg, 1987, p. 26, n. 38.
76 This opinion is primarily creditable to Moritz Voigt and his work Das jus natura-
le, aequum et bonum, und jus gentium der Römer (see Voigt, M., Das jus naturale, 
aequum et bonum und jus gentium der Römer II: das jus civile und jus gentium bei 
Römer, Leipzig, 1858). See also Voigt, M., Römische Rechtsgeschichte II, Leipzig, 1899, 
especially pp. 97 sqq. (cf. Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 343).
77 Most insistently and famously by Emilio Albertario, cf. for example Albertario, op. 
cit. n. 15, pp. 277 sqq.; Albertario, op. cit. n. 30, pp. 3 sqq.; Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 355. 
Cf. Vander Waerdt, op. cit. n. 74, p. 4866.
78 Pringsheim, F., Jus aequum und jus strictum, in: Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 
1961, pp. 131-153 (= Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Roman-
istische Abteilung, vol. 42, 1921, pp. 643-668); Pringsheim, op. cit. n. 18 (1932), pp. 
173 sqq.; Zulueta, F. de, The Development of Law under the Republic, in: Cook, S. A. et al. 
(eds.), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 9, Cambridge, 1932, pp. 842-881, pp. 868 sqq.; 
Buckland, W. W., Classical Roman Law, in: Cook, S. A. et al. (eds.), Cambridge Ancient 
History, vol. 11, Cambridge, 1936, pp. 806-844, pp. 817 sq.; Schulz, F., History of 
366 Henrik-Riko Held: Philosophical Background of the Condictio Claims in Classical Roman Law
This theory is most likely closest to the truth. However, the specific subject of 
condictio claims deserves a closer look.
One of the first things to point out in that context is the fact that the prohi-
bition of enrichment to the detriment of another, associated with condictio claims, 
is not only associated with nature generally, but also explicitly with natural 
law, or ius naturale.79 In that way a more specific and concrete legal outlook is 
assumed, and matters are not dealt with on an intangible philosophical level. 
This is not a coincidence. In the Roman legal system matters such as equity, 
justice, etc. have a very important role, but they can be taken into account only 
inasmuch as they may be realised within the confines of the ius civile.80 This 
by no means implies a necessarily rigid legal formalism. This assertion may be 
explained by the famous definition of ius as ars boni et aequi, where the law is 
considered to be the art of what is good and righteous.81 In such a system, equity 
and justice are actually realised through ius, and for that reason ius holds a sort 
of a primary and principal position through which justice is achieved, and not 
the other way around, according to which justice may be considered a general 
philosophical concept with which ius may or may not be in tune, or only to an 
extent. In that sense, jurisprudence has a sort of a sacred duty of actualising 
justice and bringing it to life through interpretation and application of the law. 
So, in the context of condictio claims as well as in other areas of Roman law, 
philosophical concepts and principles above all have a strong and explicit legal 
outlook, and should not be dismissed on account of their apparent intangible 
philosophical nature.
Further, if we consider influence of the Stoic philosophemes and terminology 
to exist only on a superficial level, this does not mean that essentially similar 
principles did not exist underneath, in the internal system of Roman law and 
its inherent disposition towards actualisation of equity and justice within the 
confines of ius civile. In other words, elements from the Stoic philosophy and 
Roman Legal Science, Oxford, 1946, pp. 62 sqq., 84 sqq., 98; Coing, op. cit. n. 21, pp. 24 
sqq.; Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 346; Vander Waerdt, op. cit. n. 74, pp. 4856 sqq.
79 See D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex var. lect.) analysed above.
80 Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 364.
81 D. 1, 1, 1 pr. (Ulp. 1 inst.). More on this definition and generally on the concpet of 
law and justice in the writings of Roman lawyers in Gallo, F., “Ars boni et aequi” e “ius 
naturale”, SDHI, vol. 75, 2009, pp. 15-42; Sokolowski, P. von, Der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff 
des römischen Rechtes, in: Studi in onore di Pietro Bonfante, vol. 1, Milano, 1930., pp. 
183-200; Waldstein, W., Aequitas und summum ius, in: Slapnicar, K. (ed.), Tradition 
und Fortentwicklung im Recht. Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Ulrich von Lübtow am 21. 
August 1990, Rheinfelden, 1991, pp. 23-33.
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ethics may have been used to justify and reinvigorate concepts both essentially 
and strictly legal (and not merely or mainly philosophical) and distinctively 
Roman. As a matter of fact, Cicero is known to have used Stoicism to justify 
religious or moral attitudes which had a different, autonomous origins.82 For 
example, Cicero invokes the bellum iustum procedure from the history of Rome 
as a good example of an ethical and orderly initiation of war.83 With that, he 
associates just war as an ethical concept, adequate for the Stoic philosophy and 
ethics, with an ancient Roman concept from ius fetiale in which such an ethical 
concept is considered to have been embodied.84 
In the mentioned example, orderly and just initiation of war as an ethically 
desirable matter in the Stoic philosophy is supported by an ancient Roman 
practice, most likely in order to give the concept a guise of authority and Ro-
man authenticity. A similar thing may have happened, although the other way 
around, in the field of condictio claims. Stoic ethical concepts such as equity, 
natural law, justice, etc., as well as the Stoic prohibition of enrichment to the 
detriment of another, being very popular in the period of pre-classical and 
classical Roman law, may have been used to justify an otherwise completely 
Roman concept from earlier times. Most important instances of the use of con-
dictio claims in classical Roman law were either already covered by the ancient 
legis actio per condictionem, or were closely associated with it and originated from 
the same legal reasoning.85 Although legis actio per condictionem was the youngest 
of the legis actiones, stemming most likely from some time between the end of 
the third and first half of the second century BC86, it still predated the most 
fruitful period of influence of middle Stoicism on Roman jurisprudence, which 
happened in the subsequent periods, as laid out above. Therefore, the aim of 
Cicero’s formula may have been to re-affirm an ethical principle that was in 
the legal field actually already essentially embodied in the application of the 
legis actio per condictionem. Association of condictio claims with concepts such as 
82 Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 127.
83 CIC. rep. II, xvii, 31 and III, xxiii, 35, as well as CIC. off. I, xi, 36. More on this 
procedure in Kaser and Hackl, op. cit. n. 25, pp. 111 sqq. and Held, H.-R., Podrijetlo 
postupka legis actio per condictionem, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 67, 
no. 2, 2017, pp. 197-227, pp. 201 sqq., with references to sources and further litera-
ture.
84 Cf. Hausmaninger, H., “Bellum iustum” und “iusta causa belli” im älteren römischen Recht, 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, vol. 9, no. 3-4, 1961, pp. 335-
345, pp. 342 sqq.
85 See literature in n. 1. Cf. Held, op. cit. n. 83.
86 Kaser, Hackl, op. cit. n. 25, p. 111, n. 5 and 6.
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justice and equity, in fact, should not be surprising in the least, since the legis 
actio per condictionem procedure in its original application was closely associated 
with the concepts of iustum and fides.87 
In that way an imprint of Stoic philosophy on Roman law may have been the 
use of Stoic terminology and general guise of Stoic ethics by Roman lawyers to jus-
tify legal reasoning already extant in Roman legal sources regardless of the Greek 
philosophy. Consequently, although superficially Stoic, invocation of principles 
such as natural law, equity and the like was not an un-Roman philosophising or 
an imposition of an extra-legal and supra-legal principle.88 It was an affirmation of 
the application of a perfectly sound legal logic, based on an already existing matter 
of Roman law. In the part of this text dealing with the problem of the origins of 
the principles and concepts associated with condictio claims, in the context of the 
famous Si et me et Titium fragment (D. 12, 1, 32 (Cels. 5 dig.)), it was mentioned 
how in at least one instance a condictio claim was granted by interpretation and 
taking into account that which is right and fair (bonum et aequum). Consequently, 
even if the respective principles did help an interpretative widening of the scope 
of condictio claims and their application to situations unenvisaged previously in 
the legis actio per condictionem strictly speaking, they still followed the same logic 
and never fell outside its conceptual scope.89 With such a conclusion, the use of 
Stoic elements in the context of condictio claims may neither be considered their 
conceptual root, nor a postclassical philosophical addition. However, it should 
also not be considered only an embellishment, a fad of the time used for the sake 
of itself. It may well have been, we hope to have at least convincingly suggested, 
a reinvigoration and a reaffirmation of a perfectly sound and typically Roman 
legal matter with the spirit of the times.
5. CONCLUSION
The problem of the philosophical background of the condictio claims in classi-
cal Roman law, while being an intricate matter, is of such a nature that a possible 
87 More on this in Held, op. cit. n. 83, pp. 197 sqq. Cf. Kaser, op. cit. n 1 (1971), p. 111 
sqq. and the referenced literature, especially in n. 2.
88 Cf. Maschi, C. A., Il diritto naturale come ordinamento giuridico inferiore?, in: L’Europa e il 
diritto romano. Studi in onore di Paolo Koschaker, vol. II, Milano, 1954, pp. 425-437, pp. 
436 sq.; Colish, op. cit. n. 74, pp. 365 sqq. Similar conclusion is reached by Vander 
Waerdt regarding the ostensibly Stoic philosophical concept of natural law in the 
classical Roman jurisprudence (Vander Waerdt, op. cit. n. 74, pp. 4887, 4894 sq.).
89 Cf. the emphasis on abstractness of both legis actio per condictionem and condictio cla-
ims in Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 835.
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explanation of one issue associated with it inevitably has consequences for all 
the other different aspects. In that sense, the viewpoint that the philosophical 
references in the context of condictio claims most likely have pre-classical and 
classical roots narrows down possible philosophical influences, and helps to 
determine their actual scope. In order to achieve more clarity and an orderly 
exposition of the argument, this text has dealt with the three mentioned mat-
ters separately.
There are no serious reasons to doubt the pre-classical and classical origins 
of principles and concepts such as natura, ius naturale, aequitas, etc., explicitly 
associated in the sources with the prohibition of enrichment to the detriment 
of another and with condictio claims. With that, the matter of their inspiration 
is narrowed down to certain Greek philosophical schools. Although often asso-
ciated with condictio claims, Aristotle’s and the Peripatetic concept of commuta-
tive justice actually has little or no importance for them. A more direct line of 
influence, most notably in Cicero’s work, can be found in relation to the Stoic 
prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, along with all the other 
principles and concepts of Stoic philosophy and ethics in the relevant context. 
Finally, the mentioned principles and concepts may be considered to have had 
a specific role in the matter. They definitely did not give cause to the creation 
of condictio claims, which were rooted in the ancient Roman legis actio per con-
dictionem, although they did on occasion help widen the application of condictio 
claims via interpretation, all the while maintaining their essential function. The 
analysed principles and concepts were also most likely not only mere verbiage 
or a suitable decoration. We hope that we have demonstrated that they at least 
possibly were a tool for reaffirming a typical and ancient Roman legal principle 
already embodied in the application of legis actio per condictionem.
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FILOZOFSKI OKVIR KONDIKCIJSKIH ZAHTJEVA U KLASIČNOM 
RIMSKOM PRAVU **
Autor u radu analizira problem filozofskog okvira kondikcijskih zahtjeva u klasičnom 
rimskom pravu uzimajući u obzir tri različita aspekta navedene problematike. Najprije se 
bavi pitanjem klasičnosti određenih filozofskih načela i koncepata povezivih s kondikcijskim 
zahtjevima u izvorima, kao što su ius naturale, aequitas, natura itd. Ustanovivši njihovo 
klasično podrijetlo kao najvjerojatnije, nadalje analizira mogući utjecaj određenih konkret-
nih grčkih filozofskih škola. Odbacujući na temelju različitih razloga mogućnost utjecaja 
aristotelovskog i peripatetičkog koncepta ispravljačke pravednosti (iustitia commutativa 
ili correctiva) na kondikcijske zahtjeve, odlučuje se za vjerojatniji utjecaj stoičke filozofije i 
etike, konkretno stoičke zabrane obogaćenja na teret druge osobe te opće stoičke terminologije 
i filozofema. Naposljetku, raspravljajući o konkretnom dosegu navedenog utjecaja, zaključuje 
kako je glavna uloga stoičkih načela bila potvrditi već postojeće i tipično rimsko pravno 
načelo utjelovljeno u primjeni legisakcije per condictionem, koje se naknadno očitovalo 
u raznovrsnoj upotrebi različitih kondikcijskih zahtjeva u klasičnom rimskom pravu.
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